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Even though this third claim did not succeed, the Fourth Circuit
agreed that "evidence of a prior-vacated death penalty is of limited, if
any, relevance to the jury's decision whether to impose the death
penalty." Id. However, the court held that this information was not
so "constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing
process" as to rise to a Booth violation. Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862 (1983)).
South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989), supports the
even broader proposition that comments made by the prosecution to
the jury about the victim's character are irrelevant to the sentencing
decision and a violation of the defendant's eighth amendment rights.
"For the purposes of imposing the death penalty.., the defendant's
punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral
guilt." Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2210 (quoting Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982)). It seems reasonable to argue that any evidence,
including evidence of a prior vacated death sentence, which does not
relate to a heightened degree of personal culpability is also irrelevant.
This theory of relevancy is only true of information about Gaskins'
previous sentences, and obviously does not apply to revelation of
Gaskins' prior murder convictions.
Both Booth and Gathers were 5 to 4 decisions with different
Court memberships. During this past term, the U.S. Supreme Court
as currently constituted initially agreed to reconsider Booth and
Gathers in Ohio v. Huertas, 1991 WL 3926 (U.S.). However, the
Court ultimately dismissed the state's petition for certiorari as im-
providently granted and failed to rule on the Ohio Supreme Court's
finding that admission of victim impact evidence violated the
defendant's constitutional right to have the sentencing decision made
by the jury and judge.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. McInerney
EVANS v. MUNCIE
916 F.2d 163 (1990)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Wilbert Lee Evans shot and killed a deputy sheriff while attempt-
ing to escape from state custody. He was convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death in 1981. This sentence was vacated when the
Commonwealth confessed error on the sentencing proceedings. A
new jury was impaneled and subsequently recommended the death
penalty based upon a finding of "future dangerousness." Evans v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 468, 323 S.E.2d 114 (1984).
Evans was denied relief at the state habeas level, and in his first
federal habeas petition. Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117 (4th Cir.
1989); see also case summary of Evans v. Thompson, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 10 (1989). After his second habeas petition
at the federal level, the district court for the Eastern District of
Virginia granted a stay of execution. The Commonwealth appealed
this decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit vacated the stay of execution.
HOLDING
Evans raised two claims in support of his motion to stay his
execution. His first claim was that the eighth and fourteenth
amendments prohibit the execution of a defendant when his behavior
subsequent to sentencing casts doubt upon the existence of the sole
aggravating factor supporting the death sentence. Evans also asserted
that the Commonwealth violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments
by refusing to provide a forum to hear and decide his first claim. Evans
presented, for the purpose of demonstrating that he lacked the ag-
gravating factor of "future dangerousness," evidence that he was
instrumental in protecting the lives of prison employees during an
escape attempt by several death row inmates.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that these claims constituted "new rules" which federal courts may not
use in collateral proceedings to overturn a final state conviction. The
court also held that his claims did not allege a constitutional violation
remediable by a federal court.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The "new rule" doctrine states that "habeas corpus cannot be
used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure unless those rules would be applied retroactively to all
defendants on collateral review." Teague v.Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
The Teague Court defined a new rule as one "not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." 489
U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original). The purpose of the "new rule"
doctrine is to allow state courts to issue their decisions based upon a
faithful application of well established constitutional standards existing
at the time the case is heard, even though later decisions may modify
those standards. Butlerv. McKellar, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990); see
also case summary, Butler v. McKellar, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
3, No. 1, p. 2 (1990).
In the instant case, the Fourth Circuit determined that Evans was
asking for a new rule. However, Evans purposely phrased his claim
in a manner that he hoped would place it within one or both of the
recognized exceptions to the Teague new rule doctrine. Nonetheless,
the court found that neither of the exceptions applied. While the
Fourth Circuit's holding may be correct, the reasoning employed
deserves some discussion, particularly with regard to future cases.
The first exception to Teague is substantive in that it allows the
application of a new rule on collateral review if the new rule places
"certain kinds of conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe." Evans, 916 F.2d at 166, quoting Teague,
489 U.S. at 311. According to the Fourth Circuit, Evans' claim
advocated the new rule that "the Constitution requires a state to
reestablish the validity of an error-free sentence because a prisoner
desires to present character evidence based on his post-sentencing
conduct." Evans, 916 F.2d at 165. On that characterization of his
claim, the court held that the first exception had nothing to do with the
new rule being sought.
The claim that Evans put forward could have received deeper
analysis. A recent decision by the United States Supreme Court stated
that the first exception includes cases where the imposition of a
particular form of punishment is prohibited on a certain class of
individuals. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2952-53 (1989). The
irrelevance of a first exception claim by Evans seems less apparent
when it is phrased in terms of Penry. The more favorable charac-
terization of Evans' claim is that he belongs to a class of persons who
may not be executed. His specific argument is that the Constitution
protects individuals sentenced to death solely upon the aggravating
factorof future dangerousness if theirconduct subsequentto conviction
demonstrates a lack of future dangerousness.
At this writing, however, the Court has recognized only one post-
sentence occurrence that can spare death sentenced prisoners from
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execution. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), held that insan-
ity will prohibit the carrying out a of death sentence. In a footnote, the
Evans court limited post-conviction review to the circumstance of
insanity. Evans, 916 F.2d 166, n. 1.
The second exception to the Teague new rule doctrine is pro-
cedural in nature, permitting a new rule to be applied retroactively if
it is a "watershed" rule that is essential to the fundamental fairness of
the proceeding. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2822,2831 (1990). Evans
asserted that no procedure exists whereby his first exception claim
might be heard. The nature of his second claim is such that it falls with
the first. The lack of procedure to hear a first exception claim is moot
when the first exception claim is found not to have merit. Nonethe-
less, the second Evans claim brings up an interesting distinction be-
tween reliability and "fundamental fairness."
The court analogizes Evans' second exception claim to several
cases involving new evidence relevant to the conviction or sentencing
of the defendant. Their reasoning does not entirely address Evans'
claim regarding a change in his death qualification after sentencing.
A typical Teague second exception claim would involve the inability
of the accused to present evidence at the guilt or sentencing phase of
a trial, or fundamental procedural impediments affecting reliability.
Evans asserts that the rule regarding accuracy of conviction should
also apply to death qualification, which in the case of a conviction
based solely upon future dangerousness could involve matters after
sentencing.
The "watershed rule" definition of the second Teague exception
is a narrow reading in that "fundamental fairness" seems to exclude
anything but a glaring deprivation of rights during trial. In the name
of finality in judicial decision-making, the Sawyer decision all but
eliminates the second exception as a means of federal habeas relief.
(See case summary of Sawyer v. Smith, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
3, No. 1, p. 4 (1990)). Historically, the purpose of habeas corpus has
been protection of the wrongly accused. Capital punishment based
upon future dangerousness raises the question of whether one may be
"innocent" of the death penalty. Cf. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,
537 (1986).
In closing, the Court of Appeals labeled Evans' claim as a plea
for executive clemency clothed as a petition for habeas relief. The
Evans decision does not further narrow federal habeas review but it
does demonstrate that few avenues of relief are available after sen-
tencing and direct appeal. Although evidence that long term predictions
of future dangerousness are unreliable continues to mount (See
Marquart and Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-commuted
Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23
Loyola L.A.L. Rev. 5 (1989)), practically speaking there is simply no
procedure for assessing claims that a sentencing jury erred in its
finding.
Summary and analysis by:
Christopher J. Lonsbury
BASSETTE v. THOMPSON
915 F.2d 932 (1990)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Herbert Russell Bassette was convicted of the 1979 murder of a
sixteen-year-old night attendant during the robbery of a gas station in
Richmond. Three participants in the robbery testified that Bassette
shot the victim while he begged for mercy. This case arises from
Bassette's federal habeas corpus petition.
Bassette presented thirty-six grounds for relief to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. That court
found that all but seven of these claims were barred by a Virginia state
rule that prevents the hearing of a claim by a federal court if it has not
been brought previously to a state court. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth circuit decided that under a new line of cases, all but
three of Bassette's claims for habeas corpus relief are barred.
HOLDING
Bassette asserted many grounds for relief but the holdings of the
U.S. Court of Appeals which merit discussion in this summary are
limited to those which are not bound by the specific facts of the case.
The Court held that the district court read Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.
255 (1989) and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) too narrowly, and
should not have heard seven of Bassette's claims. Bassette v.
Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 936 (1990). Harris holds that when it is
contended that an appellant is barred from presenting a claim to the
federal court because of state procedural rules, the federal court may
still elect to consider the federal questions involved unless the state
court has specifically stated it found against appellant based on a
procedural bar. Harris, 489 U.S. at 261. Teague addressed, among
other things, the issue that a claim, when it has never been raised in
state court, is barred from federal consideration when there is no
mention of the claim in the state opinion. Teague, 489 U.S. at 299.
The Fourth Circuit decided that the Harris rule is limited by Teague
because it would be illogical to expect a state court to invoke
specifically a state bar to void a claim it has not heard either in court
or in brief. The court decided that Bassette could have brought his
claims to the state court, and therefore the procedural bar contained in
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(B)(2) prevents him from bringing his
claims before the federal court in habeas corpus. This statute provides
that a claim shall not be heard "on the basis of any allegation of facts
of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any previous
petition."
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Despite holding that Bassette's claims were barred, the court
went on to issue advisory opinions on several of them. Bassette
claimed that he should have been advised of his Miranda rights prior
to a post conviction interview. During this interview, which was
conducted by parole and probation officers, Bassette maintained his
innocence. The prosecution used these statements to argue that
Bassette was not entitled to mitigation of the death sentence because
his failure to accept responsibility for the murder was evidence of
future dangerousness. Despite the judge's certification that he did not
rely on Bassette's statements from this interview when affirming the
jury's death sentence, Bassette urged Miranda had been violated.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) supports his position by holding
that use of statements by defendants undergoing court ordered ex-
aminations where defendants are not advised of theirMiranda warnings
violates the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments. The Court of
Appeals stated that 28 U.S.C. §§ 2245 and 2254 (1988) support the
proposition that ajudge's affidavit is sufficient to create a presumption
of truth that supports a finding of harmless error. Id. at 938. The court
seems to misuse the statutes. 28 U.S.C. §2245 is procedural in nature
and requires that judges certify the facts concerning their findings at
sentencing hearings in order to complete the trial level record. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) is also a procedural statute. It acknowledges the
